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Anonymous Networks

Anonymous overlay networks and multi-hop privacy chains. Covers Tor, I2P, Lokinet, and VPN-based anonymity approaches.

CAUTION

Authorized Use Only.

Overlay networks described here are dual-use technologies. Running a Tor relay, I2P node, or VPN client is legal in most jurisdictions but may be restricted or criminalized in others. Using them to evade lawful investigation, commit unauthorized access, or traffic illegal material is prohibited. See ../../SECURITY.md before proceeding.

Scope​

This subcategory covers:

  • Tor - onion routing, relay types, hidden services, bridges, pluggable transports.
  • I2P - garlic routing, eepsites, in-network services, threat model differences from Tor.
  • Lokinet and alternatives - LLARP-based routing, mixnets, Nym, comparison to Tor/I2P.
  • VPN and multi-hop chains - commercial VPNs, self-hosted VPNs, VPN-over-Tor, Tor-over-VPN, multi-hop chains, common chain mistakes.

This subcategory does NOT cover:

  • how to configure a specific VPN provider (out of scope, changes often),
  • legal advice on using anonymity networks in a specific country,
  • attack/deanonymization techniques against these networks (see ../08 Attacks and Detection/).

Files​

#FileFormatFocus
01TorHands-onOnion routing, relay types, bridges, hidden services
02I2PHands-onGarlic routing, eepsites, threat model
03Lokinet and AlternativesHands-onLLARP, mixnets, Nym
04VPN and Multi-hop ChainsHands-onVPN types, Tor+VPN chains, common mistakes

All files use the Hands-on format: Installation, hardening, operational usage, common mistakes, attacks, detection, case studies, legal and ethical notes.

Threat Model Summary​

Anonymous networks provide different guarantees. Choosing the wrong network for a threat model is a common mistake.

NetworkPrimary threat defended againstKnown weaknesses
TorLocal network adversary, IP correlation by destinationGlobal passive adversary, traffic confirmation, malicious exits
I2PSame as Tor, with a different mix of trade-offsSmaller network, slower, fewer exits
LokinetLow-latency onion routing with a different incentive modelYoung network, less audited
VPNISP-level surveillanceSingle point of trust (provider), correlation with billing identity

No single network defends against all adversaries. Read the per-file ## Threat Model sections before choosing.

Operational Notes​

  • Never mix identity across networks. A pseudonym used on Tor and a pseudonym used on I2P must never be linkable.
  • Assume timing correlation works. A global passive adversary can correlate entry and exit traffic with enough time and traffic volume.
  • Bridges are not a magic solution. They help against IP blocklists, not against a global adversary.
  • VPN-over-Tor and Tor-over-VPN are different. Each has a specific threat model. See 04 VPN and Multi-hop Chains.md.

Running any of these networks as a client is legal in most countries. Running a relay or exit node has additional considerations:

  • Exit nodes see unencrypted traffic; you may be liable for what passes through. Read your jurisdiction's laws before running an exit.
  • Some hosting providers forbid relays in their AUP; check before deploying.
  • Running a bridge is lower-risk than an exit, but still requires care.

See ../../SECURITY.md for the repository's authorized-use policy.

References​